Sunday, June 03, 2007

Bob Woodward.
State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.

Book information: publisher, Amazon.com.

Whereas Thomas Ricks' Fiasco gives a picture of the Iraq quagmire via the failures of the military leadership and their interactions with the civilian leadership, Woodward focuses on the senior political and civilian leadership in Washington. Together these two books give insightful views on the multifaceted Iraq quagmire from different angles. In addition to Woodward's main focus on Iraq-related decision making, his book documents the more general problem of Execute Branch dysfunction. That is, neither the individuals involved (i.e., Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, etc.) nor the organizational structures (i.e., Departments of Defense and State, National Security Council, etc., "the interagency") of the Executive Branch are capable of managing the challenges of the Iraq undertaking. Danner's review explains this well:

Woodward tends to blame "the broken policy process" on the relative strength of personalities gathered around the cabinet table: the power and ruthlessness of Rumsfeld, the legendary "bureaucratic infighter"; the weakness of Rice, the very function and purpose of whose job, to let the President both benefit from and control the bureaucracy, was in effect eviscerated. Suskind [ The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 ] , more convincingly, argues that Bush and Cheney constructed precisely the government they wanted: centralized, highly secretive, its clean, direct lines of decision unencumbered by information or consultation. "There was never any policy process to break, by Condi or anyone else," Richard Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state, remarks to Suskind. "There was never one from the start. Bush didn't want one, for whatever reason." (Danner, NYRB.)

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